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1Secure Ownership Transfer in Multi-tag/Multi-owner
Passive RFID Systems
Saravanan Sundaresan, Robin Doss Member, IEEE, Wanlei Zhou Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper we propose a secure ownership transfer
protocol for a multi-tag and multi-owner RFID environment. Most
of the existing work in this area do not comply with the EPC
Global Class-1 Gen-2 (C1G2) standard since they use expensive
hash operations or sophisticated encryption schemes that cannot
be implemented on low-cost passive tags that are highly resource
constrained. Our work aims to fill this gap by proposing a protocol
based on simple XOR and 128-bit Pseudo Random Number
Generators (PRNG), operations that can be easily implemented
on low-cost passive RFID tags. The protocol thus achieves EPC
C1G2 compliance while meeting the security requirements. Also,
our protocol provides additional protection using a blind-factor
to prevent tracking attacks.
Keywords: RFID, EPC C1G2, Passive Tags, Ownership Trans-
fer, Multi-owner, Multi-tag.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) enables the automatic
identification of objects using radio waves without the need
for a physical contact with the objects. One of the important
features of an RFID system is secure ownership transfer of
objects from one owner to another. For example, objects change
hands frequently in different stages of a supply chain from
manufacturing, to distribution, to warehousing, to retailing, to
end-customers. It is imperative to make this transfer happen
in a secure fashion and that the internal state of the RFID
tag reflects these changes accurately. Ownership transfer re-
quires that control (i.e., communication capabilities) of a tag is
transferred from the current Owner/s to the new Owner/s. To
elaborate, ownership transfer should ensure that only the new
Owners are able to interrogate the tag and the previous Owners
are prevented from communicating with the tag. However, in
order to prevent against compromise of the ownership transfer
process, security of the process needs to be guaranteed. Secure
ownership transfer requires at a minimum the establishment
of shared secrets between the tags and the new Owners. In
order to achieve this, it is important that the establishment of
new secrets is achieved in a secure fashion thus preventing
the previous Owner from communicating with the tag after the
ownership transfer. It is also important that the new Owner is
not able to compromise previous communications of the tag.
It is therefore imperative that any ownership transfer scheme
incorporates security requirements and protects the privacy of
both the new and old owners of the tag.
S Sundaresan, R. Doss and W. Zhou are with the School of Infor-
mation Technology, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia. E-mail: ssun-
dare@deakin.edu.au
A. Motivation
Most of the approaches to ownership transfer in RFID
systems do not comply with the EPC C1G2 standard for passive
RFID tags because they use hash functions which require 8000
to 10000 gates [1] making them unsuitable for the low-cost
passive tags due to the very limited computational resources.
The EPC standard mandates security operations in these tags
to Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) and 16-bit pseudo random
number generators (PRNG). A 16-bit PRNG is not secure
enough because it is vulnerable to brute-force attack and hence
we recommend the use of 128-bit PRNG which are more
secure and implementable in passive tags. Low cost passive
tags can accommodate roughly 3K gates to implement security
features [1], [2] which is insufficient for standard cryptographic
techniques such as RSA [3]. Although cheaper cryptographic
alternatives such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) exist
and schemes such as ERAP [4] based on ECC have been
proposed for RFID systems, the practical implementation of
ECC is still an open research problem. As demonstrated by
Batina et al. [5], [6] implementation of ECC would require
between 8.2k and 15k equivalent gates. Complex encryption
schemes such as AES takes up to 3400 gates as seen in [7].
Our proposed protocol requires less than 2K gates which is
a significant advantage considering the limitations of passive
tags. Also, Burmester et al. [8] have formally shown using
the Universal Composability (UC) framework [9] that 128-bit
pseudo-random generators meet the security requirements of
RFID. It is also noted that it is sufficient for the random num-
bers to be pseudo-random assuming that all entities of the RFID
system have polynomially bounded resources. This assumption
holds good for our proposed protocol also. Lee and Hong
[10] have proposed an authentication protocol that achieves
the required security using 128-bit PRNG with only 1435
gates (within 517 clock cycles and 64B memory). Our main
contributions can be summarized as: A secure multi-owner,
multi-tag ownership transfer protocol that is ultra lightweight in
terms of the use of simple XOR and 128-bit PRNG operations
that meets the necessary security requirements. Further, it does
not use hash functions making it a viable option for large-scale
implementations on low-cost passive tags.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
covers the related work in this area. The protocols are briefly
described and vulnerabilities identified. Our proposed protocol
is described in section III followed by the detailed security
analysis in section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
2II. RELATED WORK
One of the earliest schemes proposed for ownership transfer
was by Osaka et al. [11] based on hash and keyed encryp-
tion functions. However, Jappinen and Hamalainen [12] has
shown that the scheme suffers from several security flaws such
as desynchronization, replay attacks and compromise through
noise injection. The improved version [12] has been shown
to suffer from desynchronization problems [13] while the
noise injection problem has been addressed by Chen et al.
[14]. The authors propose the use of a hash function in order
to protect the integrity of the key being transferred which is
similar to the earlier work [12] and therefore suffers from
desynchronization issues. Dimitriou [15] proposed “RFIDdot”
an ownership transfer scheme based on random nonces and
a keyed encryption function making the assumption that key
updates are performed in a “private” environment. Such an
assumption is questionable; further, the scheme suffers from
desynchronization attacks due to selective blocking by an
attacker leading to permanent DoS. It also cannot guarantee
the privacy of the new owner [13]. Two lightweight ownership
transfer protocols (one with a TTP and one without a TTP)
are proposed by Kulseng et al. [16] based on Physically Un-
clonable Functions (PUF) and Linear Feedback Shift Registers
(LFSR). However, on analysis both the protocols fail to provide
the required security properties. As noted in [16] the protocol
with TTP suffers from permanent desynchronization when an
attacker selectively blocks messages; while the protocol without
a TTP is designed based on the assumption that an attacker is
not able to eavesdrop on the transmission over the wireless
channel. This is not a valid assumption as noted by Kapoor et
al. [13].
Fouldagar and Afifi [17] propose two privacy preserving
schemes for ownership transfer based on hash functions and
symmetric key cryptographic functions. In both the schemes
the update of the secret keys KU and KP is not protected
against desynchronization. Seo et al. [18] propose a scheme
based on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with the tag’s
computation moved to a “proxy” that manages each tag and
is within the backward channel range of each tag. In our
opinion, the infrastructure overhead of the scheme and the
notion of a “proxy” makes the scheme impractical. More
recently, Song and Mitchell [19] have proposed a tag ownership
transfer method based on keyed hash functions and one-time
tag identifiers using hash-chains. Kapoor and Piramuthu [20]
propose ownership transfer schemes based on keyed hash and
keyed encryption functions. The protocol with TTP suffers from
desynchronisation as the tag updates its secret even before the
new secret is given to the new owner by the TTP. The non-
TTP version also suffers from vulnerabilities that can lead to
forward secrecy compromise and tag cloning attacks. Recently
Doss et al. [21] has proposed two ownership transfer schemes
based on quadratic residues. The closed loop scheme addresses
situations where tags are present in the range of both the old
and new owners and in the open loop scheme, tags are only in
the range of the new owner.
Table I
SYMBOL NOTATIONS
Notation Description
TID, tid Unique Tag Identification Number and pre-computed value
of h(TID, ts)
OID, oid Owner ID and pre-computed value of h(OID, os)
ts, os Secret key for the tag; Secret key for owner known only
to the TTP
ots, ot
′
s Current and previous shared secret between Owners and
Tag-Group
Ns New Secret generated by TTP for the New Owners
sts, st
′
s Current and previous shared secret between the TTP and
the Tag-Group.
sos, so
′
s Current and previous shared secret between the TTP and
the New Owners.
S1r, S2r Pseudo-Random numbers generated by the TTP
O1r, T1r Pseudo-Random numbers generated by the New Owners &
Tags in the Tag-Group respectively
III. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
Our proposed protocol is based on simple XOR and 128-
bit PRNG operations and uses a blind-factor to hide the
pseudo-random numbers. The protocol has two phases - the
initialization phase and the ownership transfer phase. In the
initialization phase, all the tags and owners are setup with
their ids, shared/private secrets. This is assumed to occur in
a secure environment. The TTP computes tid = h(TID, ts)
and oid = h(OID, os) using the secrets ts, os respectively
which are known only to the TTP. All the existing Owner ids
in all the tags in the Tag-Group are retained as is. After the
ownership transfer happens, the new owners use the same ids
but have a new secret. The protocol can be easily extended
to remove the existing Owner ids and add new ones by
sending an additional encrypted message with oid in Step
2A. The TTP shares a secret sts with the group of tags
which the current and new owners do not know. Similarly,
the TTP shares a secret sos with the new owners that are
not known to the current owners. The tags store the tuple
{tid, sts, st′s, oid1 , oid2 , ...oidn , ots, ot
′
s}. The owners store the
tuple {oid, sos, so′s, T ID1, T ID2, ..T IDj , ots}. Table I briefly
describes the notations used in the proposed protocol.
A. Secure Ownership Transfer Scheme
Step 1: TTP → New Owners → TTP
Step 1A: TTP performs the following:
• Generate pseudo-random number S2r
• Generate a new secret Ns
• For each New Owner i:
– Compute X1i = oidi ⊕ PRNG(sos ⊕ S2r)
– Compute X2i = S2r ⊕ PRNG(oidi ⊕ sos)
– Compute X3i = Ns ⊕ PRNG(oidi ⊕ sos ⊕ S2r)
– For each Tag j in the Tag-Group, compute X4j =
TIDj ⊕ PRNG(Ns ⊕ sos ⊕ S2r)
– Compute Xci = PRNG(X3i⊕sos)⊕PRNG(X41⊕
X42 ⊕ ... ⊕X4j ⊕ S2r). For ease of representation,
this computation is shown in the figure 1 as Xci =
PRNG(X3i ⊕ sos)⊕ PRNG(X4(1..j) ⊕ S2r).
3– TTP then sends X1i, X2i, X3i, X4(1..j) and Xci to
the ith New Owner.
Step 1B: Each New Owner performs the following:
• Extract S2r using stored values as X2i ⊕ PRNG(oid ⊕
sos)→ S2r
• If oid = X1i ⊕ PRNG(sos ⊕ S2r) (or use so′s) then the
TTP is authenticated and the Owner knows that the mes-
sage is for itself, in which case it performs the following.
Otherwise, it aborts the protocol. For the reminder of the
operations either sos or so
′
s will be used based on which
one returned a successful match.
• Check if PRNG(X3i⊕ sos)⊕PRNG(X41⊕X42⊕ ...
⊕X4j ⊕ S2r) = Xci . Otherwise, it aborts the protocol.
This validation ensures that X3i and X4(1..j) are not
tampered by an adversary during transmission. For ease
of representation, this check is shown in the figure 1 as
PRNG(X3i ⊕ sos)⊕ PRNG(X4(1..j) ⊕ S2r) = Xci .
• Extract Ns: X3i ⊕ PRNG(oid ⊕ sos ⊕ S2r)→ Ns
• Extract TIDs: X41⊕PRNG(Ns⊕sos⊕S2r)→ TID(1).
Repeat this step for X42, X43...X4j tags.
• Owner inserts the Tag ids TID1, T ID2...T IDj and the
shared secret as ots = Ns
• Generate pseudo-random number O1r
• Compute: RNDo = O1r ⊕ oid ⊕ sos
• Compute: ACKo = oid ⊕ ots ⊕ PRNG(sos ⊕O1r)
• Owner sends RNDo, ACKo to the TTP
• If the oid was matched using sos then the shared secret is
updated as so
′
s ← sos and sos ← PRNG(sos)
Step 1C: For each New Owner’s reply, TTP performs the
following:
• Extract O1r using stored values as RNDo⊕oidi⊕sos →
O1r
• Check if oidi⊕Ns = ACKo⊕PRNG(sos⊕O1r). If yes,
it confirms the authenticity of the new Owner and that he
has the new secret.
• If acknowledgements are not received from all the owners
within a stipulated time, the process restarts from Step
1A. Otherwise the shared secret sos is updated as sos ←
PRNG(sos) and goes to Step 2.
Step 2: TTP → Tags → TTP
Step 2A: The TTP performs the following:
• Generate pseudo-random number S1r
• Compute M1 = Ns ⊕ PRNG(sts ⊕ S1r)
• Compute M c = PRNG(M1⊕ S1r)⊕ sts
• Then for each Tag j in the Tag-Group:
– Compute M2j = tidj ⊕ PRNG(tidj ⊕ sts ⊕ S1r)
– Compute M3j = S1r ⊕ PRNG(tidj ⊕ sts)
– TTP then sends M1,M2j ,M3j and M c to the jth
tag in the Tag-Group
Step 2B: Each tag in the Tag-Group performs the following:
• Extract S1r using stored values as M3j ⊕ PRNG(tid ⊕
sts)→ S1r
• If tid = M2j⊕PRNG(tid⊕sts⊕S1r) (or use st′s) then
the TTP is authenticated and the tag knows that the mes-
sage is for itself, in which case it performs the following.
Otherwise, it aborts the protocol. For the reminder of the
operations either sts or st
′
s will be used based on which
one returned a successful match.
• Check if PRNG(M1⊕S1r) = M c⊕sts. This validation
ensures that M1 is not tampered by an adversary during
transmission. Otherwise, the protocol aborts.
• The new secret Ns is extracted as M1 ⊕ PRNG(sts ⊕
S1r)→ Ns
• The current and previous secrets ots, ot
′
s are updated as
ots ← Ns; ot′s ← Ns
• Generate a pseudo-random number T1r
• Compute RNDt = T1r ⊕ tid ⊕ sts
• Compute ACKt = tid ⊕ ots ⊕ PRNG(sts ⊕ T1r)
• Tag sends RNDt, ACKt to the TTP
• If the tid was matched using sts then the shared secret is
updated as st
′
s ← sts and sts ← PRNG(sts)
Step 2C: For each tag reply, the TTP performs the following:
• Extract T1r using stored values as RNDt⊕ tidj ⊕ sts →
T1r
• Check if tidj ⊕Ns = ACKt⊕PRNG(sts⊕T1r). If yes,
it confirms the authenticity of the Tag and that its new
owner secret ots has been successfully updated to Ns.
• If acknowledgements are not received from all the tags
in the Tag-Group within a stipulated time, the process
restarts from Step 2A. Otherwise the shared secret sts
is updated as sts ← PRNG(sts). This completes the
ownership transfer process.
B. Ownership Test Protocol
We define a ownership test protocol that is carried out in a
virtual environment without any adversarial interference [22].
Because of this secure channel assumption, messages are not
encrypted. For environments where this secure channel cannot
be assumed, a mutual authentication protocol like [2] can be
used to test ownership. For each New Owner i and for each
Tag j in Tag-Group, the New Owner sends oiid, t
j
id to the Tag-
Group. Each Tag in the Tag-Group checks if tid = t
j
id and if
so, computes Mtst = oiid⊕ots⊕tid and sends it back. For each
Tag’s Reply received, and for each Tag in the Tag-Group, each
new Owner checks if oiid ⊕ ots = Mtst ⊕ tjid. If yes, the tag
ownership is confirmed and the for-loop is exited at this point
to reduce processing time. If all tags are not identified by all
owners within a stipulated time, the ownership test protocol is
restarted.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Basic Privacy/Eavesdropping: The protocol ensures basic
communication privacy since one or more secret keys is used
in combination with freshly generated pseudo-random numbers
in each communication. As the messages are protected with
the secret keys and also the pseudo-random number is hidden
using a blind-factor, the attacker will not be able decipher
anything from the messages even if they are captured using
eavesdropping attack.
4Figure 1. Proposed Ownership Transfer Protocol for Multi-Tag Multi-Owner Environment - Step 1
Mutual Authentication: When the tag performs the check
If “tid = M2⊕ PRNG(tid ⊕ sts ⊕ S1r)” and if they match,
the tag can be sure that the message comes from the legitimate
TTP because only it knows the shared secret sts. Similarly
the TTP verifies the response ACKt received from the tag,
thereby authenticating it. The same principle applies to the
communication between the TTP and the New Owners.
Tag/Owner Anonymity: Messages X1..X4, Xc,M1..M3,
M c, RNDo, ACKo, RNDt and ACKt implicitly contain tag
id tid or owner id oid but all are enciphered well and cannot
be detected by the attacker. First, tid contains only the pre-
computed hash value of the actual TID. Due to the one-way
property of the hash function, the attacker will not be able to
find TID from tid. Secondly, in order to obtain tid from M2,
the attacker has to know two different unknowns. Recall that
M2 = tid ⊕ PRNG(tid ⊕ sts ⊕ S1r) in which sts is the
shared secret between the TTP and the Tag-Group and that
changes after every successful run, S1r is a freshly generated
by TTP for each run, which is not sent in the clear but is
hidden using the blind-factor. Also, in M2, the XOR operation
between tid, sts and S1r is further randomized using the PRNG
operation. All of these measures prevent the real tag id from
being revealed. Same level of protection is ensured for owner
id OID as well.
Tag/Owner Location Privacy: The principles used above
applies to providing Tag/Owner location privacy also. Even if
the same tag-id/owner-id were to be sent repeatedly, due to the
use of pseudo-random numbers (hidden during transmission),
and also the further randomization of the XOR operation
between the shared secret and the pseudo-random number using
the PRNG operation, it ensures that the messages are different
every time they are sent thus satisfying the security property.
Replay Attack (Owner/Tag/Server(TTP) Im-
personation):Let us say an attacker captures n
communications for later use. Let the messages in the
nth capture be denoted as X1ni ..X4
n
1..j , M1
n,M2j ,M3j ,
RNDnt , ACK
n
t , RND
n
o , ACK
n
o . Now let us say the
attacker replays the (n − 5)th messages represented
as X1(n−5)i ..X4
(n−5)
1..j , M1
(n−5),M2(n−5)j ,M3
(n−5)
j ,
RND
(n−5)
t , ACK
(n−5)
t , RND
(n−5)
o , ACK
(n−5)
o . The
tags/owners/TTP will not be able to extract the pseudo-random
numbers properly because of the mismatch in the shared
secrets sts and sos which are updated during each protocol run.
Secondly the uniqueness of all the messages during each round
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Table II
COMPARISON OF SECURITY AND PRIVACY PROPERTIES
Scheme P1 P2 P3 P4 A1 A2 A3
Osaka et al. [11] X No No X X No X
Fouldagar et al. [17] X X X X X No X
Kulseng et al. [16] X X X X X No X
Dimitriou [15] X No X No X No No
Song and Mitchell [19] X X X No X No §
Kapoor et al. [13] X § § No X X X
Our Scheme X X X X X X X
P1: Tag Anonymity P2: Tag Location Privacy P3: Forward Secrecy
P4: Forward Untraceability A1: Replay Attack A2: DoS/De-synchronization Attack
A3: Server Impersonation X - Fully Satisfied §: Partially satisfied under certain assumptions.
is ensured by the freshly generated pseudo-random numbers
which are hidden during the transmission. This ensures that
verifications such as “if tid = M2⊕PRNG(tid⊕sts⊕S1r)”,
“if oid = X1⊕PRNG(sos⊕S2r)” will also fail for the same
reason. Hence the attacker will not be able to successfully
impersonate a tag or a owner or a server by replaying messages
from the previous communications.
Forward Secrecy: To show that the protocol achieves for-
ward secrecy, we prove that even if a tag is compromised and
its current resident data is obtained by an attacker, it does not
enable tracing any of the previous communications. RNDt is
computed using the freshly generated pseudo-random number
T1r (hidden during transmission) along with tid and sts which
changes after every protocol run). Similarly ACKt is computed
the same way and in addition, the XOR operation between
sts and T1r is further randomized using the 128-bit PRNG
operation that ensures ACKt is unique each time. So even if
the attacker knows sts and st‘s the previous messages of the
tags cannot be deciphered thus ensuring forward secrecy. Same
principle applies to RNDo, ACKo and also the messages in
the forward channel.
Forward Untraceability: The protocol ensures that the old
owner is unable to trace or communicate with the tag post-
ownership transfer by making sure that the old owner is not able
to learn or compromise the new secret that has been established
between the tag and the new owners. This is accomplished
by enciphering the new secret Ns in X3 using the owner
id oid, the shared secret sos which is unknown to the old
6owner and S2r which is a freshly generated pseudo-random
number (hidden during transmission). Also, the XOR operation
between oid, sos and S2r is further randomized using the
PRNG operation that provides additional security. The same
principle is applied when computing M1. Thus the protocol
achieves forward untraceability.
DoS/De-synchronization Attack: An adversary can cause
Denial of Service (DoS) by de-synchronizing the keys between
the TTP and the Tag-Group (or) the keys between the TTP
and the New Owners. In the protocol, the tag/new-owner update
their secrets before sending the acknowledgement ACKt. If
ACKt were to be blocked by the attacker or lost due to other
communication issues it will prevent the TTP from updating
its key. In order to overcome this, the tags and the new-owners
store the shared-secret from the current and previous round (ex:
sts and st
′
s). As seen in the protocol, messages are verified
using the previous secret if the current secret did not return
a match. If a match occurs using either one of the values,
the protocol run will complete successfully thus preventing
DoS/De-synchronization attacks.
A. Comparison with Other Protocols
In Table II we compare the security properties of the various
ownership transfer protocols that have been proposed. We ob-
serve that the schemes proposed by Osaka et al., and Dimitriou
fail to meet the security property of tag location privacy while
Kapoor and Piramuthu’s scheme only satisfies this property
under the assumption that a third party cannot eavesdrop
over the wireless channel. Forward secrecy is not satisfied by
Osaka et al. and partially satisfied by Kapoor and Piramuthu’s
schemes. The property of forward untraceability is not satisfied
by many of the current schemes. The schemes proposed by
Dimitriou, Song and Mitchell and Kapoor and Pirmuthu all
fail to guarantee this property. All schemes are protected
against replay attacks. Protection against desynchronisation is
only achieved by Kapoor and Piramuthu. Further, Dimitriou’s
scheme is vulnerable to server impersonation attacks while
Song and Mitchell’s scheme is only partially secure. As noted
in the security analysis, our scheme satisfies all of the required
security properties.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed a secure ownership transfer
protocol for multi-tag multi-owner RFID systems. The protocol
is ultra-lightweight as only simple XOR and 128-bit PRNG
functions are employed. Importantly, the protocol does not
use hash functions thereby meeting the EPC C1G2 standards.
Hence the scheme is practical and can be implemented on
passive tags. Security analysis of our proposed methods show
that they achieve the required properties of tag anonymity,
tag location privacy, forward secrecy, forward untraceability
while being resistant to replay, desynchronisation and server
impersonation attacks. In future work our aim is complete a
test bed implementation of the proposed scheme.
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